BMC generates 149 concrete predictions across 23 categories. Not all 149 are “falsifiable predictions” in the strict sense — and we no longer present them as one undifferentiated count. That conflation was a fair criticism of earlier versions of this page. Predictions sit on two orthogonal axes:
Epistemic status — what kind of claim is it?
T — formal result within the framework. Follows analytically from BMC definitions (e.g. the Gödel-analog $SIT_{min}>0$, the $M \gg G$ lower bound). Constrains the model; not evidence for BMC over rival theories.
R — retrodiction. Consistent with findings established in the literature before BMC (e.g. PFC maturation vs reflexion onset). Shows consistency, not differential support.
P — prospective. A risky claim with a stated measurement method and falsification threshold. Only the P-tier carries confirmatory weight, and only the P-tier is “falsifiable” in the Popperian sense.
Testability — how can it be tested? The A / B / B* / C / Open tag on each item below (existing data, meta-analysis, or new experiment). This axis is orthogonal to epistemic status.
The number that matters: the prospective scorecard
A theory earns credit from risky bets that survived, not from the length of its prediction list. The credibility-bearing claims are in the P-tier — and specifically the subset that pits BMC against a named rival theory making opposite numerical predictions (separating tests).
BMC and the standard engineering alternative make opposite numerical predictions here; the counter-intuitive BMC prediction is the one that held. Two further separating tests are confirmed in-engine via ablation: P-NM3 (WM bandwidth constrains signal complexity; $k$=2 vs $k$=5) and P-BM4 (ontogenetic critical periods enable cultural ratchet; −ONTO ⇒ ceiling, not ratchet). See Computationally Verified. P-CN1, also listed in that section, is implementation fidelity rather than a differential test and is classified R.
P-tier and T-tier — the load-bearing items, by code
For transparency, here are the items the framework above classifies as P (prospective, falsifiable — the credibility-bearing tier) and T (formal results within the BMC formalism — analytic, not evidence vs rival theories). The remaining items below are R-tier: retrodictions that show the theory is consistent with established findings, or claims awaiting an operationalized method and threshold. R-tier items show consistency, not differential support; we do not badge them individually on each line to avoid noise, but the full per-item ledger is maintained as a working document.
T-tier (14 — formal results within the formalism, not evidence vs rivals)
These follow analytically from BMC definitions; they constrain the model and serve as internal consistency checks, but do not constitute differential evidence for BMC over rival theories: P-11 (metric hierarchy from the CL composite), P-G1 ($CL_G$ ceiling from CL at $M=\emptyset$), the $M \gg G$ lower bound (underlying P-G4; the page-line of P-G4 itself is a retrodiction of mirror-test / metacognition distribution), P-NLD3 ($T_{insight} \approx 1.614\mu$ van der Pol), P-NLD4 ($\lambda_{BMC} \approx 0$ at $\sigma_{SW} \approx 1$), P-CN2 (Hopfield capacity $\sim \sqrt{|V_m|}$), P-CX1, P-CX2, P-CX3 (statistical-complexity and edge-of-chaos scaling), P-IT3, P-IT4, P-IT5, P-IT6, P-IT7 (rate-distortion, BLEND $2^k/k$, Bayesian-Occam — information-theoretic identities of the formalism).
Testability tag
Meaning
Count
A
Confirmed by existing published data
7
B
Testable with existing public datasets
10
B*
Testable via meta-analysis of existing studies
34
C
Requires new experiment or native BMC system
80
Open
SM/NM predictions awaiting empirical test
18
Four entries appear in Computationally Verified: three are P-tier separating tests with confirmed BMC outcomes (P-BM28, P-NM3, P-BM4); the fourth (P-CN1) is implementation fidelity rather than a differential test, and is classified R.
P-1Sign inversion: converts are equally extreme as lifelong adherents. Former "enemy" becomes equally intense "ally" ($|w|$ preserved, $sign(w)$ flips).B*
P-2Intermediary persuasion is more effective than direct confrontation. Indirect exposure through trusted mediators accumulates positive weight, bypassing the I-filter.B
P-3Peripheral beliefs change first in therapy. Hub cascade: high-$C_E$ memes resist change; core beliefs change last in CBT.B*
P-4Memeplex splitting increases consciousness/flexibility. Fragmented memeplex has better $\sigma_{SW}$ than a rigid one; deconversion = clarity, not confusion.B*
P-5Memeplex merging temporarily decreases CL. Cultural integration produces cognitive "fog" before recovery.B*
P-6Complexity threshold for splitting: simple belief systems are more resistant to splitting than complex ones (complexity = more degrees of freedom for $Q > Q_{crit}$).C
P-11Metric hierarchy: for global perturbations (anesthesia, sleep), $\sigma_{SW}$ alone suffices; for self-model perturbations (meditation, dissociation), full composite CL outperforms any single component.C
II. Animal Consciousness (4 predictions)
Pillar: EMT — BMC uniquely predicts a consciousness gradient with specific thresholds
P-G1CL has a hard ceiling in G-only organisms: $CL_G \leq 0.10 \cdot \sigma^* \cdot A^*$. IIT predicts no ceiling for $\Phi$.C
P-G2Phase transition at proto-M onset: discontinuous CL jump when $proto\text{-}M > 0$. Test: PCI of crows >> PCI of pigeons, beyond anatomical ratio.C
P-G3Topology over neurons: $\sigma_{SW}$ determines CL, not neuron count. Convergent topology → convergent consciousness. Test: PCI of octopus ≈ PCI of crow at similar $\sigma_{SW}$.A
P-G4$M \gg G$ required for reflective consciousness: $M/G_{crit} \sim \mathcal{O}(10)$. Mirror test and metacognition only in high-$M/G$ species.A
III. Forgetting and Reconsolidation (4 predictions)
P-A3Automatization + stigmergy reduces brain selection pressure: H. sapiens brain volume down ~10% in ~30,000 years because external storage compensates.A
P-A4Sleep within ~1h of motor learning accelerates automatization via spindle-SO coupling.A
P-SC1Scarcity as necessary condition: at $C_{max} \to \infty$, agent does not reach $SMC^{(2)}$ in comparable time. Infinite compute → no consciousness.C
P-CP1Critical period: agents isolated from S-input during the plasticity window $[t_1, t_2]$ never reach $SMC^{(2)}$ even with subsequent full access. Analog of feral children.C
P-CRE1Sleep deprivation blocks insight problem-solving: BLEND efficiency drops without offline recombination during sleep.C
P-CRE2Unsolved problems with high SIT tension appear preferentially in dreams (offline BLEND targeting unresolved gaps).B*
P-CRE3Flow interruption produces measurable brain state change within <1 second (EEG signature of G-M equilibrium disruption).C
P-CRE4Higher baseline PLAY activation (Panksepp ANPS) predicts easier flow entry and longer flow duration.B
P-CRE5Cross-domain exposure predicts creative output better than single-domain depth: higher memeplex $\sigma_{SW}$ enables more BLEND recombinations.B
P-CRE7False closure (accepting suboptimal solutions) shows reduced SIT tension but no actual knowledge progress — premature gap closure without real resolution.C
XX. Financial Markets (5 predictions)
Pillar: SM / EMT — swarm G-programs in collective market behavior
P-FM1Extreme collective FEAR activation (G-program) is a contrarian indicator: mass panic-driven sell-offs systematically overshoot fundamental value.B
P-FM2GRIEF (sustained drawdown signal) is a stronger return predictor than acute FEAR: prolonged G-activation produces deeper meme binding.C
P-FM3Optimal emotion filter differs by asset class (crypto, equity, commodity): G-program sensitivity varies with market microstructure.C
P-FM4Fear memes bind stronger than opportunity memes in collective memory: negativity bias in swarm-level cultural ratchet.B*
Pillar: SM / AGI_F — cultural ratchet, domain-agnostic architecture
P-DD1Cultural fragment library produces monotonically improving results across optimization cycles (cultural ratchet in molecular space).C
P-DD2Separate libraries per target type outperform shared libraries on dissimilar targets: domain-specific cultural memory prevents negative transfer.C
P-DD3Fragment co-success binding predicts scaffold compatibility on novel targets: stigmergic association generalizes across chemical space.C
P-DD5The same BMC architecture achieves competitive results on any pharmaceutical target without code changes: domain-agnostic engine, domain-specific environment.C
P-SAF1G-invariants (hardcoded genetic constraints) prevent value drift under adversarial training: constitutional safety survives optimization pressure.C
P-SAF2L0/L1/L2 developmental transitions are observable via self-model stability metrics: discrete phase transitions, not continuous growth.C
P-SAF3Pushing the system past stability threshold produces ADHD-like behavior: G-M oscillation without convergence.C
P-SAF4WM-limit cognitive biases (anchoring, framing) are absent in AGI with expanded working memory: biases are substrate artifacts, not algorithmic necessities.C
P-NLD1Balance ODE exhibits hysteresis: threshold to exit emotional capture ($\theta_{exit}$) is significantly higher than threshold to enter ($\theta_{enter}$). Testable via anesthesia dose asymmetry.B*
P-NLD2Hopf bifurcation in Balance dynamics: bipolar disorder = limit cycle, PTSD = excitable system near bifurcation point. Distinct dynamical signatures in PCI time-series.C
P-NLD3SIT accumulation follows relaxation oscillation dynamics: slow buildup, rapid closure (insight). $T_{insight} \approx 1.614\mu$ (van der Pol analog).C
P-NLD4Lyapunov exponent $\lambda_{BMC} \approx 0$ at $\sigma_{SW} \approx 1$. Positive $\lambda$ correlates with ADHD-like symptoms; negative with rigidity.C
P-GML1Oversmoothing metric $Rigidity = 1 - Var(a_i)/Var_0$ increases with age and correlates with cognitive inflexibility.B*
P-GML2Heterogeneous edge types (semantic, causal, temporal) activate differently under different cognitive tasks. Measurable via fMRI connectivity patterns.C
P-GML3Overlapping community membership (BigCLAM) for memes is the norm, not the exception. Individuals with higher overlap show greater cognitive flexibility.B*
P-GML4Adversarial robustness: cost to flip a belief $\varepsilon_{flip} \propto C_E \cdot I_{eff} \cdot Q_{local}$. Hub beliefs require more evidence to change.B*
P-GML5PPR teleportation: G-relevant memes maintain baseline activation even without direct stimulation, via tonic dopaminergic input.C
P-CN2Hopfield energy landscape: number of stable memeplex configurations $\sim \sqrt{|V_m|}$. For $|V_m| = 10000$: ~100 stable "states of consciousness."C
P-CN3WTA dynamics produce winner-take-all with reaction time proportional to competition strength. Higher conflict = longer decision time.B*
P-CN4E/I balance determines criticality: balanced excitation/inhibition → $\sigma \approx 1$. Measurable via E/I ratio in EEG power spectra.B
P-CX1CL correlates with statistical complexity $C_\mu$ of memeplex. Maximum $C_\mu$ at $\sigma_{SW} \approx 1$.C
P-CX2Effective connectivity $K_{eff} \approx 2$ at edge of chaos. $\sqrt{|V_m|}$ stable attractors.C
P-CX3Quarter-power scaling: $CL_{max} \propto |V_m|^{3/4}$, consolidation time $\propto |V_m|^{1/4}$.C
P-CG1SMC accuracy correlates with $CL_{reflexive}$: higher consciousness → more accurate self-model → less confabulation.C
P-CG2N400 ERP amplitude correlates with semantic prediction error $PE_{semantic}$ in BMC spreading activation.B*
P-CG3P600 ERP correlates with syntactic SIT: structural gaps in parsing generate P600-analog signals.B*
P-CG4ERN amplitude correlates with $Conflict(t)$ at error moment. Greater action competition → larger ERN.B*
P-CG5Split-brain: disconnecting BMC graph into 2 components yields 2 independent CLs, each lower than original.B*
P-CG6ToM capacity bounded by WM: $k_{ToM} \leq k_{eff} - n_{self}$. Stress reduces ToM before other cognitive functions.B*
P-CG7Sub-threshold memes ($0 < a_i < \theta_{act}$) bias decisions via Route 2 (subliminal influence) without conscious access.B*
P-IT1Cultural fidelity bounded by channel capacity $C_{meme}$. Memes with redundancy (ritual, canon) persist longer than oral-only memes.B*
P-IT2Edge weights $|w_{ij}|$ correlate with empirical mutual information $I(a_i; a_j)$ computed from activation time-series.C
P-IT3Consolidation reduces total storage cost $\sum R(D_m)$ while preserving utility-relevant information $\sum I(m; G)$.C
P-IT4Spreading activation convergence speed inversely proportional to cycle density in subgraph. Tree-like regions converge faster.C
P-IT5Consolidated memory size $\propto H(experiences | schemas)$. Agents with richer schemas compress more, retaining capacity for new learning.C
P-IT6BLEND advantage $\sim 2^k/k$ in changing environments. Agents with BLEND outperform mutation-only by exponential factor.C
P-IT7Over-complex memeplexes penalized even without information loss (Bayesian Occam pressure). Inflated $|V_m|$ → fitness decrease.C
P-RL1TD-modulated edge updates outperform pure Hebbian learning in survival tasks with delayed reward.C
P-RL2Agents with learned value function $V_{BMC}$ exhibit anticipatory behavior: pre-stimulus activation in high-V states.C
P-RL3Multi-GVF agents (predicting G-signals, spatial changes, social signals) learn faster than single-reward agents.C
P-RL4Actor-critic dissociation: ventral striatum lesion → value impairment; dorsal lesion → action selection impairment. Same $\delta$, different functions.B*
P-RL5Higher $\gamma_{BMC}$ (serotonin-linked) → better performance in delayed-reward tasks; lower $\gamma$ → better in immediate-reward tasks.B*
P-RL6Option-forming agents (chunking enabled) learn faster than primitive-action-only agents in hierarchical tasks.C
P-RL7Environment change after automatization re-engages model-based processing. Devaluation sensitivity returns when reward mapping changes.B*
Computationally Verified
These predictions have been confirmed in the BMC computational engine (Rust, 103 gate checks):
Prediction
Result
Paper
P-BM28: Language is parasitic on WM (signal memes optimized for M-fitness, not G-fitness)
$\Delta_{alive} \approx 0$ across 10 experiments, $N$=8–150