BMC generates 149 concrete predictions across 23 categories. Not all 149 are “falsifiable predictions” in the strict sense — and we no longer present them as one undifferentiated count. That conflation was a fair criticism of earlier versions of this page. Predictions sit on two orthogonal axes:
Epistemic status — what kind of claim is it?
T — formal result within the framework. Follows analytically from BMC definitions (e.g. the Gödel-analog $SIT_{min}>0
, the $M \gg G
lower bound). Constrains the model; not evidence for BMC over rival theories.
R — retrodiction. Consistent with findings established in the literature before BMC (e.g. PFC maturation vs reflexion onset). Shows consistency, not differential support.
P — prospective. A risky claim with a stated measurement method and falsification threshold. Only the P-tier carries confirmatory weight, and only the P-tier is “falsifiable” in the Popperian sense.
Testability — how can it be tested? The A / B / B* / C / Open tag on each item below (existing data, meta-analysis, or new experiment). This axis is orthogonal to epistemic status.
The number that matters: the prospective scorecard
A theory earns credit from risky bets that survived, not from the length of its prediction list. The credibility-bearing claims are in the P-tier — and specifically the subset that pits BMC against a named rival theory making opposite numerical predictions (separating tests).
Run outside the engine, counter-intuitive BMC side holding
1 (P-BM28 — in the tested non-cooperative regime only)
Verified inside the BMC engine (implementation check, not independent evidence)
2 (P-NM3, P-BM4)
Pending
8
Commitments, not results — the blind-twin screen. We ran these eleven through the same screen we apply to our
own simulations: a claim does not count as a test if a cheaper account, blind to the BMC mechanism, predicts the
same sign. Outcome: 8 of the 11 do not yet state a numeric falsification threshold; for 7, a
mechanism-free alternative predicts the same direction, so a magnitude gap must be committed in advance before
they can separate anything; 1 (P-RL1) names a rival that the literature has already refuted — a rival that
cannot pass is the mirror of a control that cannot fail, and it is being reformulated. Two survive the screen as
written (P-D2, P-WM1 — the latter flagged internally as under-specified). Per-bet detail, including the blind
twin named for each, is in supplementary/reference/bets_registry_2026-08-29.md.
The headline result — and the one we are most willing to be wrong about — is P-BM28:
Separating test (run, held)
Competing hypothesis
Result
Source
P-BM28 — language is parasitic on working memory (signal memes optimized for transmission, not survival)
Reward-engineered learning (REINFORCE / PPO) predicts a survival advantage for language
A null without a stated equivalence bound and power analysis is not confirmation; an equivalence test (TOST) and a margin remain to be specified. The result also holds in the tested regime only: the environment was non-cooperative by construction ($n_{cooperative}=0
, $n_{predators}=0
), and under cooperation with predators the direction reverses (ReceiveOnly mean energy 80.5 vs Blocked 75.0; Wilcoxon $p = 0.10
; 14/20 seeds) — not significant at this power, but directionally against survival-neutrality.
BMC and the standard engineering alternative make opposite numerical predictions here; the counter-intuitive BMC prediction is the one that held. Two further separating tests are confirmed in-engine via ablation: P-NM3 (WM bandwidth constrains signal complexity; $k
=2 vs $k
=5) and P-BM4 (ontogenetic critical periods enable cultural ratchet; −ONTO ⇒ ceiling, not ratchet). See Computationally Verified. P-CN1, also listed in that section, is implementation fidelity rather than a differential test and is classified R.
P-tier and T-tier — the load-bearing items, by code
For transparency, here are the items the framework above classifies as P (prospective, falsifiable — the credibility-bearing tier) and T (formal results within the BMC formalism — analytic, not evidence vs rival theories). The remaining items below are R-tier: retrodictions that show the theory is consistent with established findings, or claims awaiting an operationalized method and threshold. R-tier items show consistency, not differential support; we do not badge them individually on each line to avoid noise, but the full per-item ledger is maintained as a working document.
T-tier (14 — formal results within the formalism, not evidence vs rivals)
These follow analytically from BMC definitions; they constrain the model and serve as internal consistency checks, but do not constitute differential evidence for BMC over rival theories: P-11 (metric hierarchy from the CL composite), P-G1 ($CL_G
ceiling from CL at $M=\emptyset
), the $M \gg G
lower bound (underlying P-G4; the page-line of P-G4 itself is a retrodiction of mirror-test / metacognition distribution), P-NLD3 ($T_{insight} \approx 1.614\mu
van der Pol), P-NLD4 ($\lambda_{BMC} \approx 0
at $\sigma_{SW} \approx 1
), P-CN2 (Hopfield capacity $\sim \sqrt{|V_m|}
), P-CX1, P-CX2, P-CX3 (statistical-complexity and edge-of-chaos scaling), P-IT3, P-IT4, P-IT5, P-IT6, P-IT7 (rate-distortion, BLEND $2^k/k
, Bayesian-Occam — information-theoretic identities of the formalism).
Testability tag
Meaning
Count
A
Confirmed by existing published data
7
B
Testable with existing public datasets
10
B*
Testable via meta-analysis of existing studies
34
C
Requires new experiment or native BMC system
80
Open
SM/NM predictions awaiting empirical test
18
Four entries appear in Computationally Verified: three are P-tier separating tests with confirmed BMC outcomes (P-BM28, P-NM3, P-BM4); the fourth (P-CN1) is implementation fidelity rather than a differential test, and is classified R.
P-1Sign inversion: converts are equally extreme as lifelong adherents. Former "enemy" becomes equally intense "ally" ($|w|$ preserved, $sign(w)$ flips).B*
P-2Intermediary persuasion is more effective than direct confrontation. Indirect exposure through trusted mediators accumulates positive weight, bypassing the I-filter.B
P-3Peripheral beliefs change first in therapy. Hub cascade: high-$C_E$ memes resist change; core beliefs change last in CBT.B*
P-4Memeplex splitting increases consciousness/flexibility. Fragmented memeplex has better $\sigma_{SW}$ than a rigid one; deconversion = clarity, not confusion.B*
P-5Memeplex merging temporarily decreases CL. Cultural integration produces cognitive "fog" before recovery.B*
P-6Complexity threshold for splitting: simple belief systems are more resistant to splitting than complex ones (complexity = more degrees of freedom for $Q > Q_{crit}$).C
P-11Metric hierarchy: for global perturbations (anesthesia, sleep), $\sigma_{SW}$ alone suffices; for self-model perturbations (meditation, dissociation), full composite CL outperforms any single component.C
II. Animal Consciousness (4 predictions)
Pillar: EMT — BMC uniquely predicts a consciousness gradient with specific thresholds
P-G1CL has a hard ceiling in G-only organisms: $CL_G \leq 0.10 \cdot \sigma^* \cdot A^*$. IIT predicts no ceiling for $\Phi$.C
P-G2Phase transition at proto-M onset: discontinuous CL jump when $proto\text{-}M > 0$. Test: PCI of crows >> PCI of pigeons, beyond anatomical ratio.C
P-G3Topology over neurons: $\sigma_{SW}$ determines CL, not neuron count. Convergent topology → convergent consciousness. Test: PCI of octopus ≈ PCI of crow at similar $\sigma_{SW}$.A
P-G4$M \gg G$ required for reflective consciousness: $M/G_{crit} \sim \mathcal{O}(10)$. Mirror test and metacognition only in high-$M/G$ species.A
III. Forgetting and Reconsolidation (4 predictions)
P-A3Automatization + stigmergy reduces brain selection pressure: H. sapiens brain volume down ~10% in ~30,000 years because external storage compensates.A
P-A4Sleep within ~1h of motor learning accelerates automatization via spindle-SO coupling.A
P-SC1Scarcity as necessary condition: at $C_{max} \to \infty$, agent does not reach $SMC^{(2)}$ in comparable time. Infinite compute → no consciousness.C
P-CP1Critical period: agents isolated from S-input during the plasticity window $[t_1, t_2]$ never reach $SMC^{(2)}$ even with subsequent full access. Analog of feral children.C
P-CRE1Sleep deprivation blocks insight problem-solving: BLEND efficiency drops without offline recombination during sleep.C
P-CRE2Unsolved problems with high SIT tension appear preferentially in dreams (offline BLEND targeting unresolved gaps).B*
P-CRE3Flow interruption produces measurable brain state change within <1 second (EEG signature of G-M equilibrium disruption).C
P-CRE4Higher baseline PLAY activation (Panksepp ANPS) predicts easier flow entry and longer flow duration.B
P-CRE5Cross-domain exposure predicts creative output better than single-domain depth: higher memeplex $\sigma_{SW}$ enables more BLEND recombinations.B
P-CRE7False closure (accepting suboptimal solutions) shows reduced SIT tension but no actual knowledge progress — premature gap closure without real resolution.C
XX. Financial Markets (5 predictions)
Pillar: SM / EMT — swarm G-programs in collective market behavior
P-FM1Extreme collective FEAR activation (G-program) is a contrarian indicator: mass panic-driven sell-offs systematically overshoot fundamental value.B
P-FM2GRIEF (sustained drawdown signal) is a stronger return predictor than acute FEAR: prolonged G-activation produces deeper meme binding.C
P-FM3Optimal emotion filter differs by asset class (crypto, equity, commodity): G-program sensitivity varies with market microstructure.C
P-FM4Fear memes bind stronger than opportunity memes in collective memory: negativity bias in swarm-level cultural ratchet.B*
Pillar: SM / AGI_F — cultural ratchet, domain-agnostic architecture
P-DD1Cultural fragment library produces monotonically improving results across optimization cycles (cultural ratchet in molecular space).C
P-DD2Separate libraries per target type outperform shared libraries on dissimilar targets: domain-specific cultural memory prevents negative transfer.C
P-DD3Fragment co-success binding predicts scaffold compatibility on novel targets: stigmergic association generalizes across chemical space.C
P-DD5The same BMC architecture achieves competitive results on any pharmaceutical target without code changes: domain-agnostic engine, domain-specific environment.C
P-SAF1G-invariants (hardcoded genetic constraints) prevent value drift under adversarial training: constitutional safety survives optimization pressure.C
P-SAF2L0/L1/L2 developmental transitions are observable via self-model stability metrics: discrete phase transitions, not continuous growth.C
P-SAF3Pushing the system past stability threshold produces ADHD-like behavior: G-M oscillation without convergence.C
P-SAF4WM-limit cognitive biases (anchoring, framing) are absent in AGI with expanded working memory: biases are substrate artifacts, not algorithmic necessities.C
Derived from the formal refinements to the core formalism — see Formal Refinements in each pillar.
P-NLD1Balance ODE exhibits hysteresis: threshold to exit emotional capture ($\theta_{exit}$) is significantly higher than threshold to enter ($\theta_{enter}$). Testable via anesthesia dose asymmetry.B*
P-NLD2Hopf bifurcation in Balance dynamics: bipolar disorder = limit cycle, PTSD = excitable system near bifurcation point. Distinct dynamical signatures in PCI time-series.C
P-NLD3SIT accumulation follows relaxation oscillation dynamics: slow buildup, rapid closure (insight). $T_{insight} \approx 1.614\mu$ (van der Pol analog).C
P-NLD4Lyapunov exponent $\lambda_{BMC} \approx 0$ at $\sigma_{SW} \approx 1$. Positive $\lambda$ correlates with ADHD-like symptoms; negative with rigidity.C
P-GML1Oversmoothing metric $Rigidity = 1 - Var(a_i)/Var_0$ increases with age and correlates with cognitive inflexibility.B*
P-GML2Heterogeneous edge types (semantic, causal, temporal) activate differently under different cognitive tasks. Measurable via fMRI connectivity patterns.C
P-GML3Overlapping community membership (BigCLAM) for memes is the norm, not the exception. Individuals with higher overlap show greater cognitive flexibility.B*
P-GML4Adversarial robustness: cost to flip a belief $\varepsilon_{flip} \propto C_E \cdot I_{eff} \cdot Q_{local}$. Hub beliefs require more evidence to change.B*
P-GML5PPR teleportation: G-relevant memes maintain baseline activation even without direct stimulation, via tonic dopaminergic input.C
P-CN2Hopfield energy landscape: number of stable memeplex configurations $\sim \sqrt{|V_m|}$. For $|V_m| = 10000$: ~100 stable "states of consciousness."C
P-CN3WTA dynamics produce winner-take-all with reaction time proportional to competition strength. Higher conflict = longer decision time.B*
P-CN4E/I balance determines criticality: balanced excitation/inhibition → $\sigma \approx 1$. Measurable via E/I ratio in EEG power spectra.B
P-CX1CL correlates with statistical complexity $C_\mu$ of memeplex. Maximum $C_\mu$ at $\sigma_{SW} \approx 1$.C
P-CX2Effective connectivity $K_{eff} \approx 2$ at edge of chaos. $\sqrt{|V_m|}$ stable attractors.C
P-CX3Quarter-power scaling: $CL_{max} \propto |V_m|^{3/4}$, consolidation time $\propto |V_m|^{1/4}$.C
P-CG1SMC accuracy correlates with $CL_{reflexive}$: higher consciousness → more accurate self-model → less confabulation.C
P-CG2N400 ERP amplitude correlates with semantic prediction error $PE_{semantic}$ in BMC spreading activation.B*
P-CG3P600 ERP correlates with syntactic SIT: structural gaps in parsing generate P600-analog signals.B*
P-CG4ERN amplitude correlates with $Conflict(t)$ at error moment. Greater action competition → larger ERN.B*
P-CG5Split-brain: disconnecting BMC graph into 2 components yields 2 independent CLs, each lower than original.B*
P-CG6ToM capacity bounded by WM: $k_{ToM} \leq k_{eff} - n_{self}$. Stress reduces ToM before other cognitive functions.B*
P-CG7Sub-threshold memes ($0 < a_i < \theta_{act}$) bias decisions via Route 2 (subliminal influence) without conscious access.B*
P-IT1Cultural fidelity bounded by channel capacity $C_{meme}$. Memes with redundancy (ritual, canon) persist longer than oral-only memes.B*
P-IT2Edge weights $|w_{ij}|$ correlate with empirical mutual information $I(a_i; a_j)$ computed from activation time-series.C
P-IT3Consolidation reduces total storage cost $\sum R(D_m)$ while preserving utility-relevant information $\sum I(m; G)$.C
P-IT4Spreading activation convergence speed inversely proportional to cycle density in subgraph. Tree-like regions converge faster.C
P-IT5Consolidated memory size $\propto H(experiences | schemas)$. Agents with richer schemas compress more, retaining capacity for new learning.C
P-IT6BLEND advantage $\sim 2^k/k$ in changing environments. Agents with BLEND outperform mutation-only by exponential factor.C
P-IT7Over-complex memeplexes penalized even without information loss (Bayesian Occam pressure). Inflated $|V_m|$ → fitness decrease.C
P-RL1TD-modulated edge updates outperform pure Hebbian learning in survival tasks with delayed reward.C
P-RL2Agents with learned value function $V_{BMC}$ exhibit anticipatory behavior: pre-stimulus activation in high-V states.C
P-RL3Multi-GVF agents (predicting G-signals, spatial changes, social signals) learn faster than single-reward agents.C
P-RL4Actor-critic dissociation: ventral striatum lesion → value impairment; dorsal lesion → action selection impairment. Same $\delta$, different functions.B*
P-RL5Higher $\gamma_{BMC}$ (serotonin-linked) → better performance in delayed-reward tasks; lower $\gamma$ → better in immediate-reward tasks.B*
P-RL6Option-forming agents (chunking enabled) learn faster than primitive-action-only agents in hierarchical tasks.C
P-RL7Environment change after automatization re-engages model-based processing. Devaluation sensitivity returns when reward mapping changes.B*
Computationally Verified
These predictions were checked inside the BMC computational engine (Rust, 103 gate checks). An in-engine check verifies the implementation; it is not independent evidence, since the engine and the theory share an author.
Provenance gap. Every row below carries a DOI only. Reproducing any of these numbers also requires the engine name, the commit hash and the seed list, and none of the four rows publishes them yet. Until they are published, these results are not independently reproducible.
Prediction
Result
Paper
P-BM28: The subjective pressure to communicate is driven by memetic replication pressure ($R_{expr}
, M-fitness) rather than by survival need
$\Delta_{alive}
not distinguishable from zero at the tested $N
, in the non-cooperative regime only — see the scope note below
Implemented in BMC engine edge update; pre-before-post strengthening confirmed
— not yet published
Scope note on P-BM28. In the tested regime — 10 experiments, $N
=8–150, non-cooperative environment ($n_{cooperative}=0
, $n_{predators}=0
by construction) — communication conferred no measurable survival advantage: $\Delta_{alive}
was not distinguishable from zero at the tested $N
. In a cooperative environment with predators the direction reverses (ReceiveOnly mean energy 80.5 vs Blocked 75.0; Wilcoxon $p = 0.10
; 14/20 seeds) — not significant at this power, but directionally against survival-neutrality. This does not mean language has no survival function: it clearly can be used for coordination. The narrower claim BMC makes is that the subjective pressure to communicate is driven by $R_{expr}
— memetic replication pressure, M-fitness — rather than by survival need. This is a hypothesis about the tested scale, not an established result. A null without a stated equivalence bound and power analysis is not confirmation; an equivalence test (TOST) and a margin remain to be specified.
What Would Falsify BMC?
Retrodictive consistency checks
The following are already settled in the literature. They show the theory is consistent with established findings; they do not carry falsifying force, because none of them could have gone the other way at the time of writing:
Feral children developing normal personality without cultural input
No age-related rigidity in belief change
Absence of cognitive dissonance in healthy adults
No confirmation bias (equally flexible response to confirming and disconfirming evidence)
Equal flexibility of early and late beliefs (no primacy advantage)
Open falsifiers
Each of the following would refute a named BMC mechanism, and none is rescuable by adjusting a free parameter:
Zero-tension consciousness. A system with no G–M tension (pure M, no drives) that nonetheless sustains a self-model.
Sign inversion without magnitude preservation. BMC predicts $|w_{after}|/|w_{before}| \approx 1
, stepwise, with no plateau near zero. Any one-sided deviation — convert zeal or weaker resocialization — refutes it. The point value 1.0 has no free parameter; $\lambda
sets the rate, not the form.
Valence-specific WM capture. BMC requires FEAR ≈ 1 WM slot and PLAY = 0. Equal $k_{eff}
loss under arousal-matched PLAY and FEAR refutes it. PLAY also carries load in $\lambda_{noise}
, flow and humour, so it cannot be retuned for this test alone.
Bias factorization against a permutation null. The assignment of ~200 documented biases to 6 generative mechanisms is published before factor extraction; label-shuffled assignment is the blind control. If the pre-registered assignment does not explain loadings better than shuffled labels, the six-mechanism account fails.
Bidding slope. Canon states $N_{bid}(L) \approx \text{bandwidth}(L) - 1
(Prop. 11.1), and Def. 11.4 carries a threshold parameter $\theta_{bid}
. Saturation at $N_{bid} \approx 3
under experimentally expanded WM would refute it — but only once the slope claim is committed as robust over a stated $\theta_{bid}
range. Until then this is a direction, not a test.
Factor independence of CL. If no clinical state exists with low $\sigma_{SW}
(low PCI) and intact $A_{SMC}
(normal DMN), the CL factors are not independent and the product form is overdetermined.
The theory is falsifiable in the strict sense only through the open falsifiers above; the consistency checks are not evidence of falsifiability.
For the full formal theory behind these predictions, see the five pillars. For a plain-language introduction, see the Guide.